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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT . 
In the present document, submitted for consideration by the 
Trade Committee and the Commission at their respective sessions, the 
secretariat has reproduced certain studies previously issued only 
for restricted circulation, and relating to various' financial problems 
connected with the Latin American common market project. The studies 
in question were éarried out as part of the work programme laid down 
in resolutions 1 (I) and 9 (II) of the Trade Committee, and were 
specially prepared at the request of the Inter-Governmental Conference 
for the Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American 
Countries. The secretariat was likewise requested to organize a 
« 
meeting of governmental representatives of central banks, which was 
held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in January I960, and the findings of 





Rote: The origin of the studies assembled in the present document, 
considered in the order of their inclusion, was as follows: 
A. The document entitled Payments and credits in the free-trade 
area projected by Latin American countries; Possible systems 
was issued for restricted distribution on 30 October 1959, and 
was presented, as Working paper No. 1, to the Meeting of 
Governmental Representatives of Central Banks held at Montevideo 
in January I960. 
B. The Further considerations on the system of swing credits in 
the free-trade area are dated 14 December 1959 and supplement 
* • paper A. - The akove-mentiohed meeting of central banks had 
an opportunity of discussing this study, which had not • 
previously been published in any form. 
C. The Report of the Meeting of Governmental Representatives of 
Central Banks to the second session of the Inter-Governmental 
Conference for the Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among 
Latin American Countries had been previously issued only in 
the provisional version presented to the Conference. It is 
included here, unrevised, because of the interest attaching 
to its content. 
D. The last study in the present document, The ror.ipronc-l credits 
system f.ov the free-trade area, discusses the fir-dings of the • 
Meeting of Governmental Representatives of Central Banks 
referred to above, and had hitherto only been circulated for 
internal use at the second session of the Inter-Governmental 
Conference for the Establishment of a Pree-Tz'ade Area among 
Latin American Countries. 
Pressure of time has precluded final revision of tne studies 
incorporated in the present document. They must therefore be regarded 
as subject te modification in the event of their being published in a 
more definitive version. 
/A. PAYMENTS 
A 
PAYMENTS AND CREDITS IN THE FREE-TRADE AREA 
PROJECTED BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: 
POSSIBLE SYSTEMS 




I# GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS -
A. Purpose of the report 
1. At the First Conference held by the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay at Montevideo in early September 
1959, for the purpose of drafting a free-trade area treaty, it was agreed 
to invite governmental representatives of the Central Banks of these 
Countries to meet, also at Montevideo, in early December with a view to 
studying the payments questions arising in connexion with the operation 
of the 3TQB.M 
In order to facilitate the work of the Central Banks meeting, the 
Governments concerned requested the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the International Monetary Fund to carry out special studies on the 
payments problem and as to possible solutions, recommending that due 
account be taken, in making these studies, of the views expressed on the 
matter by the delegations at the Montevideo Conference, 
In resolution 9 (II) (Panama, May 1959), the Trade Committee requested 
the ECLA secretariat to study the probleri of payments in an inter-Latin 
America Common Market. Although this report refers particularly to the 
situation of the seven countries that are interested in creating the 
free-trade area,, the evaluations and conclusions in 11 are to a large 
extent valid for all the countries of Latin America and should be regarded 
in some measure as a prelude to the report requested by the Trade 
Committee. 
B. ?lews expressed at the Montevideo Conf^ren^ 
2. . . There was general agreement among the delegations present to the 
effect that the efficient operation of the area woulo. be assisted .if-all 
settlements for intra-area trade and transactions could be effected on a 
uniform basis. If this should not prove practicable, it would be 
necessary to consider establishing some payments mechanism which would 
harmonize so far as possible the different systems in operation, from 
1/ Resolution 3, adopted at the Montevideo Conference for the ' 
Establishment of a Free-Trade Area, invites the Central Banks of 




the point of view of their effect on intra-area trade. 
There was no disagreement as to the advisability of developing 
a credit mechanism which would contribute to the achievement of the 
following objectives: 
(a) to counter the depressive effects exerted on intra-area trade 
by the seasonal imbalances in its flows; and 
(b) to facilitate the policy of trade expansion resulting from 
- the programme for reducing and eliminating customs duties 
and other restrictions in the area. 
However, though there was agreement on the need for establishing some 
form of special credit facilities, the scope of the system and the 
sources from which such credit should come were not discussed in detail. 
3. In addition, individual delegations indicated the general position 
of their respective countries on certain aspects of the payments questions. 
These views may be broadly summarized as follows: 
(a) Countries which have long enjoyed convertibility - as is the 
case of one possible member of the area in particular - are not in favour 
of any system that would involve the adoption of restrictive practices with 
respect to such convertibility. Nor do they wish to endorse a systan 
which would balance payments within the group of participants. In their 
opinion, the successful operation of the free-traae area so far as 
payments are concerned could be ensured if each country avoided persistent 
disequilibria in its balance-oinpayments position yj.^a-vrs the rest of 
the world $ 
(b) Countries which, ivithin their over-all programme of monetary 
reform, have lately been taking steps to apply and maintain a system of 
increasing convertibility - as several of those interested in joining 
the free-trade area - would not favour anjr approach conducive to the 
strengthening or reinstatement of the restrictive or bilateral procedures, 
that their reforms would eliminate or.tend to eliminate; and 
2/ It should be recalled in this connexion that article 4 of the 
projected treaty establishes the principle of reciprocity by 
virtue of which equivalence is to be maintained between the benefits 




(c) Countries - such as one of those taking a leading part in inter-
Latin American trade - which, for various reasons, find it neither possible 
nor advisable to abandon, either immediately or in a fairly short space 
of time, the bilateral accounts through which, without having to use 
convertible currency, they now settle the bulk of their transactions with 
most of Latin America, favour a payments system for the area that would 
be so constructed as to be compatible with the use of bilateral accounts 
and gradual progress towards convertibility and the expansion of 
multilateral procedures. 
C. Credit facilities 
t 
4» At this juncture, a brief commentary should be made on the general 
relationship between the movement towards eliminating artificial and 
selective barriers to the development of multilateral trade in the 
area, and the advisability of maintaining credit mechanisms among the 
members of the area. 
5» Factors such as the unification of the multiple exchange rates 
into a single effective rate; the consequent disappearance of the 
indirect import subsidies that frequently resulted from the existence 
of multiple exchange rates as well as of the duties originating in 
the same source: which often had to be borne by exports and hence 
by certain productive activities; and the replacement of direct methods 
of payments control and import selection by those ox an indirect nature, 
apart from other positive factors deriving from the monetary reforms, 
wpXL undoubtedly have a salutary effect on foreign trade as a whole. 
6. Nevertheless, the movement towards uniform and more orthodox 
settlement arrangements does not appear to be helpful to the expansion 
of inter-Latin American trade as such, in view of the special 
circumstances surrounding the development of such trade. The method 
of direct control over imports and exports enabled each country to grant 
preferences or special treatment to other countries in the region with 
respect to their reciprocal trade apd reduced the growth of competition 
by similar goods from other markets. With the abolition of direct 




through that channel has disappeared. The consequent slackening of 
trade, flows has been followed by a drop in the production of certain 
items. And although, to a certain extent, recourse is now being 
had to another kind of preferential treatment - that of exempting 
Latin American countries from the obligation to make prior deposits 
which is currently imposed on importers in many countries the 
incentive it offers is less powerful than that given by the old method» 
Moreover, the concession of this new type of stimulus is essentially 
impermanent, since the amount of the prior deposit may be changed at 
any time, and as progress is achieved in granting freedom of trade 
and payments over a ,wider area, may be reduced and may ultimately 
disappear altogether» 
7. Once the free-trade area has been established, however, it will have 
other means at ist disposal for giving substantial encouragement to 
area trade, since under the terms of the programme, it will reduce and 
eliminate, for its members, customs duties and charges and other general 
restrictions. As this elimination of barriers is expected to give 
a strong impulse to branches of trade that are today virtually non-
existent, namely, durable manufactured goods and capital goods, concern 
is naturally felt as to the possible impact on exchange holdings if 
settlements, are effected in freely convertible, currencies or in currencies 
that:are freely transferable within the area» Moreover., on:-, of the 
„basic principles of the free-trade area is that there should be 
reciprocity of benefits deriving from the operation of its rules^ but 
these benefits - so far as. individual countries are concerned may 
accrue gradually and it might well be necessary, by the granting of 
credits^ to bridge the gap between the immediate results of concessions 
granted by an individual country and the benefits.of reciprocal 
concessions from its partners that would not be felt until after, a 
c.ertain lapse of time. 
8. In general, it would seem fair to say that the prevision of special 
.credit facilities, linked to- intra-area trade, would help to allay the 
doubts and hesitations that would naturally be aroused by the 
/ implementation of 
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implementation of the trade liberalization measures provided for in 
the programme and would assist in ensuring reciprocity of concessions 
and advantages deriving therefrom. 
D. International payments 
9# In principle, the settlement of international transactions in the 
area could take place in any of the following ways: 
(a) exclusively in convertible currencies (including credits 
in such currencies); 
(b) exclusively through bilateral accounts (including bilateral 
credit margins granted reciprocally thereunder); 
(c) partly in convertible currencies and partly over bilateral 
accounts (including both credits in convertible currencies 
and bilateral credit margins). 
10. The views expressed at the Montevideo Conference indicate that 
the first possibility mentioned above is unlikely to prove - at least 
for the timé being - generally acceptable, since there are some countries 
which consider it preferablè to keep the existing bilateral payments 
accounts in operation, because they feel it would be premature to 
demolish a structure whose disappearance might in their opipion be 
prejudicial to ohe trade levels attained in certain sòccora* Moreover, 
they do not vrî h to find themselves obliged to settle seasonal imbalances, 
which are often high, in convertible currency. These are valid 
arguments and :*t only remains to ensure that, if settlements are effected 
through bilateral accounts, the necessary measures are taken to prevent 
such monetary arrangements from distorting the ficw of trads in the 
area or from resulting in discrimination ¿against thos*; countries that 
wiph to settle in convertible currencies.. 
11« The second possibility (all settlements to be effected through 
bilateral accounts) would also seem unlikely to be generally acceptable. 
What is more, it would seem counter to the tendency that has developed 
in recent inonths towards the suppression of bilateral settlement 
procedures. But if, nòne the less^ it should be agreed to adopt 




clear that some mechanism -would, have to be established (as was the case, 
for instance, in Europe, with the European Payments Union) which would 
effectively multilateralize, at periodic intervals, the whole or a 
substantial part of the balances accruing on these accounts. If this 
were not achieved, intra-area trade would no develop, as ±3 essential, 
on multilateral lines, there would exist the risk of trade flows being 
dictated by monetary and not by commercial considerations, and the 
resulting distortions, and almost inevitable discriminations, would 
tepid to defeat the objectives of the free-trade area itself, 
12. Finally, there is the possibility that settlements within the area 
should take place both in convertible currencies and through the use of 
bilateral accounts, according to the arrangements adopted by individual 
pairs of countries. This method - which has the advantage of being 
flexible and dynamic — would have the disadvantage that the basis of 
settlements within the area would not be uniform. But how serious 
is this disadvange? And again the answer would seem to turn on the 
degree of transferability accorded to the balances held on the bilateral 
accounts and the extent to which bilateral arrangements would tend to 
introduce discrimination in intra-area trade. If the private trader is 
free to carry out authorized transactions anywhere in the area, whithout 
discrimination as to country, and, automatically, to make or receive 
payment for this transaction, then the risk of .discrimination can 
only arise in inter-Government transactions; and this risk can to a 
. large extent be eliminated by regular, periodic and multilateral 
compensation of the balances held on the bilateral accounts (or a 
substantial part thereof) through some central ager-cy. 
13. Sopie. suggestions as to how a mixed system of settlements of this 
sort (i.e. with some countries settling in convertible currencies 
and others through bilateral accounts) could pperate in practice 
will be offered in another part of this paper. 
/E. ' Payments 
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E. Payments systems 
14. During recent years, consideration has frequently been given in 
Latin America to the setting-up of some form of payments system along 
the lines developed in Europe from 1947 onwards. In fact, in Europe, 
this development passed through three stages» The earliest - a somewhat 
limited multilateral payments agreement - lasted from 1947 until 1949. 
It was then succeeded by the European Payments Union (EPU), which provided 
for complete transferability inside the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) area and a substantial system of mutual credits. In 
December 1958, when most European countries has restored external conver-
tibility to their currencies, the EPU was replaced by the European Monetary 
Agreement, which had been expressly designed to enter into operation in 
this eventuality.^ 
2/ It will be recalled that one of the cardinal points of policy of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation was that freedom 
of trade and freedom of payments must go forward together, and that 
some system of mutual credits was necessary to reinforce the reserves 
of member countries and enable thqm to expand their trade multilaterali-
zation measures. Thus the 0EECfs trade liberalization code, which has 
been in operation since August 1950 and whose adoption was made 
conditional on the coming into force of the European Payments Union, 
states that :'the need to create as wide a market as possible in which 
goods and services may be freely exchanged cannot be completely 
achieved until a sufficient equilibrium is restored to intra-European 
payments, as part of the effort towards establishment of a single 
system of multilateral trade in the world, an equilibrium which will 
enable member countries to exchange goods and services freely with 
each other without endangering their monetary reserves"; and one of 
the express purposes of the European Payments Union was "to facilitate 
in the largest possible measure the liberalisation, cn a non-
discriminatory basis, of trade and visible t.ĉ nŝ tjoii«* and to 
"provide'member countries in particular, with reserves to play in 
the part the role of gold and foreign currency reserves11. 
Finally, the European Fund, which was set up under the European 
Monetary Agreement that entered into force in December 1958, was 
established expressly "to provide the member countries with credit 
in order to aid them to withstand temporary over-all balance-of-
payments difficulties, in cases where these difficulties endanger 





The development of a compensation system, as a preliminary step 
leading to a payments union, as occurred in Europe, presupposes the 
existence of a considerable number of bilateral accounts, since the 
irolume of possible multilateral transfers that the system can produce 
increases with the number of surplus and deficit balances brought into 
compensation, and, conversely, if the number of bilateral accounts is 
relatively small, the system is unlikely to produce any worthwhile results. 
Until fairly recently, the number of bilateral accounts maintained by the 
Latin American countries and the tendency to establish new accounts, even 
towards the end of 1958, favoured a move towards multilateralism by gradual 
development from some simple system for compensating bilateral balances.. 
However, the recent shift towards the suppression*of bilateral accounts, 
the desire not to adopt new ones, and the possibility of taking more 
efficient steps to eliminate bilateralism would seem to suggest that progress 
through some compensation system - essentially based on the maintenance of 
bilateral accounts - is no longer the most suitable procedure for the Latin 
American area. 
F. Agency 
15« If the need for special credit facilities in the area is accepted 
and, even more, if some part of the settlements for inl-ra-area trade are 
effected through bilateral accounts and there is agreement on the need for 
some mechanism that will,, achieve periodic multilateralisat.ion of some 
part or the whole of these balances, then it will be necessary to establish 
a central agency* 
The precise functions of such an agency wi 1.1 have to be established 
in full technical detail, but, in broad terms, it is suggested that its 
terms of reference could be: 
(a) to act as the channel through which the intra-area credit 
arrangements, especially if these are automatic, will be operated; 
(b) to provide the mechanism for the multilateralisation of the 
balances held on bilateral accounts; and 
(c) to provide a centre for the compilation of financial data and for 
financial studies, on the basis of which the area's monetary 




It is clear that, if the agency is to carry out efficiently the 
functions described above* it will have to have its own resources. 
And this in turn will mean that it will have to be endowed with its 
own independent personality in international law. 
16. The amount of the agency's capital or fund will depend on what 
arrangements are reached as to intra-area credit facilities and for the 
multilateralization of balances on bilateral accounts and thus can only 
be determined at a later stage. Suffice it to say here that the 
agency1s capital or fund: 
(a) might be derived from quotas subscribed by the member countries 
and also, possibly? from contributions from non-member Governments and 
international organizations; 
(b) need not be suscribed in full at the time of the agency's 
establishment. It would for instance be perfectly possible for a 
relatively small percentage to be paid over initially and for the 
balance of the agreed contributions to be called up as and when the 
agency has need of further funds. 
It need hardly be added that the agency would have to maintain the a 
closest relations with the Central Banks of the member countries and 
that it would be subject to the authority and directives of the competent 
bodies of the fivje-trade area. 
II* TtG FUNCTIONS AND OPERATION OF A PAYIiLN'VS SYSTEM 
17. Two of the major functions of a payments system designed to assist 
the full and harmonious development of the free-trade area will be: 
(a) to ensure as far a3 possible that the maintenance of bilateral 
accounts and credit margins dcos not have a discriminatory effect on 
intra-area trade, and 
(b) to act as a channel through which the intra-area swing credit 
arrangements - especially if these are automatic - will be operated. 
These two functions of the System are to some extent interrelated, 
at least in so far as its multilateral credit arrangements must take 
account - in whole or in part - of the development of the balances on 
the bilateral accounts. For the sake of clarity, however, it will be 
preferable to consider separately the various ways in which the functions 




18. But first a word as to the general framework of the system. It is 
envisaged that: 
(a) a central agency would be established with which the Central 
Hanks of all member countries would maintain an account; 
(b) these accounts would be kept in United States dollars and at 
regular intervals - every 60 or 90 days - the balance thereon would be 
determined, taking account of the payments and transfers which the rules 
of the system provide should be reported to the agency for incorporation 
by the latter in its books; 
(c) when the balances have thus been determined - at the end of 
each "accounting period" - the Agency would then proceed with the 
settlement of the balances; these settlements would be effected - as 
provided for under the rules of the system - either in credit, or in 
convertible currencies, or partly in credit and partly in convertible 
currencies. 
19- ' When intra-area transactions are settled freely in convertible 
currencies, there is clearly no need for any special mechanism to ensure 
the multilateralization of such payments. 
The position is however quite different where settlements are 
effected over bilateral accounts, the balances on which can only be used 
for making payments to the bilateral partner in question. Ksre the 
danger is two-fold* In the first instance, a country in approximate 
equilibrium with the area may find itself in considerable payments 
difficulties if its imports are having to be paid for, in the main, in 
convertible currencies, whilst the bulk of its exports are being settled 
over bilateral accounts and thus in currency which cannot be.used to pay 
for its imports. 
The second danger arises from the pressures which settlements over 
non-transferable bilateral accounts may well create on the flows of 
trade. For instance, in the case cited above, the country in question 




bilateral partner in order to use its accumulating bilateral surplus 
and to diminish the strain on its convertible currency reserves. 
Similarly, substantial bilateral credit facilities might induce 
countries to favour the placing of imports where such credits are 
available, even though normal commercial considerations might suggest 
that the purchases be effected in some other country of the area. 
20. The simplest way of avoiding these difficulties would be to 
provide, through a payments mechanism, for the multilateralization, 
at regular intervals, of all balances on the bilateral accounts. This 
was, indeed, one of the major purposes of the European Payments Union, 
whose provisions in this regard effectively eliminated any real risk 
of trade distortions resulting from financial considerations. 
But whilst this must be the goal towards which Latin American 
payments arrangements should move as rapidly as circumstances permit, 
it would seen clear that its immediate attainment is not possible, 
and that some interim arrangement must be developed which will allow, 
and indeed encourage, a more gradual progress towards complete 
monetary transferability within the area, and thence, to full 
convertibility. 
21. A number of possibilities might be considered to this of 
which, perhaps., the two following suggestions might be the easiest 
to operate in practice. It could be agreed that limits ¡mould be 
set to the swing credits available on bilateral accounts and that 
any balance in excess of this figure - at the end of the "accounting 
period" - should be transferred to the agency and thus rendered 
available for us^ by any creditor country in the'area. Clearly, the 
efficacy of this provision would depend on the size of the credit 





An alternative method for partially multilaterali2ing the 
bilateral accounts, would be to provide that at the end of each 
accounting period, a certain percentage - say 20 per cent to 
begin with - of the bilateral balances or of (some of them 
should be transferred to the agency. A percentage figure 
of this order of magnitude would mean that credit extended 
bilaterally would be multilateralized over a period of some 15 
to 18 months an,d thus would allow ample time for the reversal of 
seasonal swings.^ It would, however, be necessary to reach 
agreement on how the bilateral balances existing at the time 
of the coming into force of the payments system should be dealt 
wi(th# 
22. But whatever method be adopted - another, for instance, 
would be to transfer balances that had been continuously outstand-
ing for longer th.an a given time - the procedure in the agency 
would be the same. 
The creditor country1s multilateral account in the agency 
would be credited with the amount transferred and the debtor 
country's account would be correspondingly debited; and those 
credit or debit entries would then be taken into account in the 
agency1 s csO_.;ul<itions of settlement against multilateral credit 
of, resulting dollar payments» 
23® Another situation remains to be considered. There may be, 
and actually are, countries which export essential commodities 
such as sugar and cotton to other possible members oj' the area 
and which register persistent and substantial or edit, bi\j.a nc-as 
againstthe importers of these items. 
kj Multilateral settlement does not preclude the reservation 
of certain bilateral balances in order to meet trade 
contingencies* 
c / O n c e the 
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Once the area had been established, the system of reciprocity 
in respect of the concessions granted which it would bring into 
operation would perhaps influence such situations, but would 
probably do so by gradual degrees. Meanwhile, the country with 
a persistent credit balance would be able to incorporate into 
the system only a proportion of the value of its exports of the • 
commodities in question. This proportion would gradually increase 
from year to year until it reached 100 per cent, or until the 
date at, which the competent organs of the area reconsidered the 
prpblem® 
24. Another important function of the payments system will be 
to provide - through the agency - a channel for the granting 
and receipt of credits, in support of the area*s trade 
liberalization policy. 
It would clearly be in the interests of the system that it 
should be able to operate with the maximum degree of automaticity; 
and thus that each country* s credit margin in the agency - and the 
procedures under which these credit margins are to be operated ~ 
shpuld be agreed on at the time the system is established. 
25» Once the amounts of the credit margins had bee.1.: agreed on* 
5/ 
two questionc- would have to be settled, namely (a) how will the 
credit margins be operated in the context of the agancy:s periodic 
settlements? and (b) how will the positions of individual countries 
be calculated in the agency for the purpose cf determining their 
efctitlement to receive credit or their obligation to grai-t it, 
and for the purpose of determining what payments in convertible 
currencies are due to or by the agency? 
26» On the first point, any number of formulae can be conceived, 
but in the interests of simplicity (and also to avoid the risk 
of too severe a drain on the agency*s assets) the choice would seem to lie between: (a) settling deficits and surpluses wholly * 
m—mmmmmrnmmm^^m—^—i^^mmmmmmmmmmm^mmm * 




in credit up to the limit of the credit margins, and thereafter 
wholly in convertible currencies; or (b) settling deficits 
and .surpluses in part by the use of credit margins, the balance 
being settled in convertible currencies; and whep. the credit margin 
is exhausted, entirely in convertible currencies. 
Arguments can be advanced in favour of both systems and the 
decision - which does not, of course, affect the amount of credit 
available to, or made available by, each country in the system -
is . essentially a matter for discussion and negotiation between the 
Member countries in the light of their individual preferences. 
27. It should be noted that, in both cases the agency would .require 
a capital or fund of its own. This need arises from the possibility 
that one or more creditor countries might have exhausted their 
credit margins to the agency (and thus be entitled to receive 
settlement wholly in convertible currencies) at a time when the deficit 
countries had still not reached the limits.of their credit margins 
and were thus settling with the agency wholly ¿n credit, or partly 
in credit and partly in convertible currencies*. 
III. POSSIBLE.SYSTEMS 
28. Eafore the formulas for harmonising the different views on the 
payments problem currently held by the countries interested in joining 
the free-trade area are expounded, a brief account should be giyen 
of the recent general evolution of inter-Latin American payments. 
The bilateral accounts through which most trade transactions .used to be 
channelled, had extremely heterogeneous ba&ss and procedures. The 
almost complete absence of parity between the value of units of account 
and that of convertible currency for equivalent operations distprted the 
price system and conduced to the perpetual freezing of^balances. In the 
last two years the outlook has been favourable to the creation pf the 




initial stage is characterized by the adoption of the Standard Agreement 
and Standard Banking Procedure at the first session of the Central Banks 
Working Group (Montevideo, 1957) and their application to nearly all 
clearing-account trade. The establishment of parity between units of 
account and actual dollars, above all, and the consequent influence of 
this system on quotations of goods at international prices provided the 
fundamental elements for a continuation of the movement towards multila-
teralism. 
At its second session the Central Banks Working Group (Rio de Janeiro, 
1958) threw fresh light on the payments problem and its evolution and also 
drew up a Protocol to regulate, in the event that the countries continued 
to maintain accounts, the transfer of balances which were being effected, 
in an incidental way, on the basis of the Standard Agreement.^ 
In view of these antecedents, of the lines of action that emerged 
from the recent Conference at Montevideo and of the tendency revealed, in 
the last few months for the suppression of bilateral accounts, some 
payments formulas might be proposed for transactions within the free-
trade area. 
Some of these formulas are based on the possibility of organizing 
a priori credit systems and might be adopted if - as is the c-se in the 
countries which would constitute the area - the opinio?: continues to 
prevail that* because of general considerations related to the aggregate 
balance of payments, the use of dollars for current trade transactions 
in the area should be reduced as much as practicable. Another formula, 
based on credits a posteriori, would take effect if all transactions 
through current accounts were settled in dollars« 
6/ See the following ECLA documents: . Report submitted tc the ECLA 
Trade Committee by the Central Banks Working Grouv: or-, a multi-
lateral payments system (E/CN. 12/kBk); Inter-Latia American 
(E/CN. 12/C.Tftki. 1/8 and annexes I and iT); ~Rg£ort' 




A. System of a priori credits (combined system) 
29, The system would be developed at two different levels. The first 
would relate to transactions effected by countries not linked by bilateral 
accounts; and the second to countries members of the system and linked 
by bilateral accounts. The agency for the system would maintain one 
account per country, through which the multilateral payments and claims 
would be effected and into which thé bilateral balances agreed on would 
be incorporated. 
30. The mechanism of the system might prove somewhat complicated if 
the agency registers individually all claims ani payments inherent in the 
internal trade of the area. In order to simplify the scheme, it would 
7/ 
be necessary to choose operational decentralization.-*-' 
Each Central Bank would determine which commercial banks or other 
institutions in its country were authorized to operate as part of the system. 
These authorized institutions would effect claims ani payments through 
their representatives in the other countries of the area. At the end of 
each accounting.period, or when convenient, the commercial banks would 
liquidate their net position in the corresponding Central Bank, which 
would thus, register only one balance - debit or credit - for each 
authorized institution. The consolidation of these balances would of 
course, be the position which each Central Bank would register with the 
agency. This latter would take cognizance of the positions of all Central 
Banks. 
31* Within this scheme it would not be difficult to locate any discre-
pancies that might appear when the operations were computed. All that 
would Vie required would be for the authorized inetitutiors zo declare, at 
the end of each accounting period, their balances with each of their 
representatives. As the declarations of each pair of representatives 
2/ Should, such decentralization not exist, the following procedure would, 
have to be followed. Payments under such heads as the value of the 
goods traded, transport and insurance expenditure and other items 
whose inclusion is agreed upon would be effected through each of these 
accoionts. To liquidate operations use would be" made of documentary or 
clean credits or orders for payment, opened or issued by Central Banks 
or directly by commercial banks or other institutions in the country 
concerned,, notification of these being sent to the agency for book-
keeping purposes and, as an authorization of reimbursement, to the 




in respect of their reciprocal operations must be equal to each other 
- one with a plus and the other with a minus sign - discrepancies could 
be quickly cleared up by this means. 
32. From another point of view,the adoption of this scheme would 
channel inter-Latin American trade operations through the private banking 
system, whose intervention in such trade has hitherto, for various 
reasons, been less than its participación in trade with the rest of the 
world. 
33» Under the system, the countries maintaining bilateral accounts would 
operate in exactly the same way as the multilateral account countries as 
regards their relations with these latter. From this point of view, all 
the member countries1 participation in the agency would be subject to 
common regulations and procedures. 
34. The establishment of the agency would not necessarily involve the 
termination of bilateral relations based on extant payments agreements. 
While they deemed it preferable, the parties to such agreements would 
continue to effect their reciprocal payments through the accounts 
concerned, but, as has already been said, on condition that they adhered 
to the rules of the Montevideo Standard Agreement. 
Periodically, at the close of the same periods agreed upon for the 
regular liquidations effected by the agency, specific proportions of the 
bilateral-account balances would be transferred to the multilateral 
system. To this end, a fixed proportion of the balance registered in 
each bilateral account on a given date, irrespective of the amount such 
balances represented, should be incorporated into the agency's multilateral 
compensation. This proportion might be, for instance, 20 per cent of 
the bilateral balance concerned. 
The proportion of the bilateral balances which would be transferred 
to the agency through the application of this arrangement, would 
determine the position of member countries in their bilateral relations 
and would be included in the position of each country deriving from its 
dollar transactions. 
35• The following example sheds some light on the foregoing procedure 
as regards the incorporation into the system of a proportion of the 
bilateral balances. . ..... /For simplicity's 
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For simplicity's sake, let it be supposed that there are only four 
members and that bilateral relations exist between countries B andD and 
between countries C and D. 
The bilateral balances susceptible of liquidation through the 
agency would be: 
B-3 D 3 
C-4 D 4 




Assuming that we are dealing with the first period of operations 
and that the initial position of each country shows no balance, the 
following result would be obtained: 







A 8 0 8 f5 
B -3 -3 -6 -5 
C 2 -4 -2 -2 
D -7 f7 0 0 
It thus clear that, if the multilateral credit were, for example, 
5.for each member> country A would obtain a reimbursement of 3 and 
country B would have to effect a payment of 1, x/h_Lch mer>ns thr.i the agency 
would have to make a net disbursement of 2, offset by jr. equivalent 
increase in its credit balance. 
The model presented shows hew greatly the use of convertible currency 
in the financing of intra-area trade could be reduced, especially if it is 
borne in mind that the multilatéral positions correspond only to the 
difference between exports and imports. 
/B. A posteriori 
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B. A posteriori credit: system 
36. A scheme of this kind would be applied if it were considered 
desirable that current intra-area transactions between countries that 
practised or had adopted convertibility, or between such countries and 
the parties to bilateral accounts, should be negotiated daily in 
dollars. 
Bases for operation 
37. The system would comprise two phases, one corresponding to dollar 
payments, and the other deriving from the incorporation of part of the 
bilateral balances into the system for automatic multilateral settlement. 
38. As has already been pointed out, the agency would have at its 
disposal a capital or fund in dollars formed with the quotas suscribed 
by members, as well as with contributions - perhaps of a complementary 
nature - from Government or international institutions outside the area. 
Each country would grant a credit to the agency and would receive 
one from it in return. The amount of this swing credit would be 
established on the basis of considerations such as those developed in 
paragraphs 41 et̂ .seq» . , 
39* The members would compile and forward to the agency periodical data, 
relating to accounting periods of 60 or 90 days, on the net balance of 
the dollar claims and payments effected by each of the© as a result of 
their reciprocal current transactions. To this end, each central bank 
would compute the data supplied to it by the commercial banks or other 
institutions authorized to effect exchange operations. 
Furthermore, at the same regular intervals of 60 or 90 days, the 
countrj.es maintaining accounts would transfer to the agenny the 
previously stipulated proportion of the balance on each bilateral account, 
with a view to its multilateral settlement. 
40. The agency would determine each member's net position at the end of 
the accounting period concerned, taking into consideration the two elements 
mentioned, i.e., the balance on dollar payments and the balance resulting 




When a country's net position indicated that it had effected dollar 
payments in excess of its dollar receipts, the agency would automatically 
furnish it. with a sum equivalent to the excess disbursement, to be 
debited against the credit due to it, always provided that this were 
still sufficient to cover the amount involved. Otherwise, the automatic 
loan would be reduced to the amount of the credit margin available. 
Again, if a country's net position showed that its receipts had 
exceeded its payments, it would surrender to the agency a sum in dollars 
equivalent to the resulting net balance. But, as in the. preceding case, 
this procedure would be put into effect in so far as the credit margin 
in question permitted. 
The procedure described could be illustrated by means of the figures 
in the example given in paragraph 35. 
On the basis of the hypothetical positions postulated for the four 
countries, and on the assumption that the multilateral credit were 5 for 
each member and that the accounting period concerned was the first, the 
results would be as follows: 
Country Multilateral Bilateral Net position Amounts surrendered Balance 
payments position to the by the with the 
agency agency agency 
A 8 0 8 5 5 
B —j -3 -6 2 -5 
C 2 -4 -2 2 -2 
D -7 7 0 7 0 
The agency's receipts amount to 7 and its disbursements to 9, with 
a net outflow of 2, equivalent to the amount by which the net debit 
balance of the member countries increases. 
Country A registers a favourable balance of 8 in its multilateral 
relations and shows no bilateral position. It therefore surrenders 




position vis-a-vis the agency stands at plus 5« 
Now comes the case of country B. It has disbursed 3 under the head 
of dollar payments. It also has to meet a payment of 3 to the agency, 
for purposes of the settlement of its bilateral position. As the agency 
will give it back 2 under this head - i.e., the difference between the 
amount payable and the limit of its swing credit - country B is left 
with its credit utilized (minus 5) and has effected a net disbursement 
of 1. 
Country C's earnings amount to 2, which it surrenders to the agency; 
it also has to surrender another 4 as the result of its bilateral 
movement. In this case, the latter sum is debited against the credit due 
to the country concerned, which will be left with a balance of minus 2. 
Country D loses 7 on its dollar claims &nd payments. In addition, 
it shows a positive bilateral balance of 7, which will be restored to it 
by the agency. The two positions will therefore compensate each other 
and its balance will stand at 0. 
If exactly the same situation were to recur in succeeding periods, 
the results would be as follows 1 • 
Count iy Balance Multilateral Bilateral Net Amounts surrended New 
•with the payments position position to tlv.e by the balance 
agency agency agency with the 
agency 
A 5 8 0 13 5 
B -5 -3 -3 -11 3 -5 
C -2 2 -4 -4 2 -4 
D 0 -7 7 0 7 0 
Country A is left with its surplus. Country B's dcllar payments are 
not reimbursed apd it pays its bilateral balance, since it has no credit 
margin available. Country C surrenders 2 to the agency, which assumes a 
bilateral coDimitment of 4 by increasing the same country1s debit balance by 2. 
Country D. compensates its positions; it receives 7 from the agency and 




If a third period with the same figures were to be assumed, the 
situation would be as follows: 
Country Balance Multi- Bilateral Net Amounts surrended New 
with the lateral position position to the by the balance 
agency payments agency agency with the 
agency 
A 5 8 0 13 5 
B -5 -3 -3 -11 3 -5 
C -4 2 -4 - 6 3 -5 
D 0 -7 7 0 7 0 
The agency, which in the preceding period surrendered dollars to 
the amount of 2, now' does so for, 1» The net debit balance of the 
members increases by this amount, A change takes place in the 
situation of country C, which has used up its entire credit and 
in the future wpJLl have to meet the whole of its commitments with 
dollar payments. 
Lastly, the results of a fourth period, given the same positions, 
are shown below: 
Country Balance Multi- Bilateral Net Amounts surrended New 
with the lateral position position to the by the balance 
• agency payments a -?eney agency with the agency 
A 5 8 0 13 5 
B -5 -3 -3 -11 3 -5 
C -5 2 -4 - 7 4 -5 
D 0 -7 7 0 7 0 
By the time this fourth period is reached, the agency's receipts 
and expenditure balance one another. The net amount it surrenders in 
dollars has risen to 5, and the net balance owed to it by the member 
countries represents the same sum. 
/C. Aspects 
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C. Aspects common to both systems 
1* Multilateral credit 
41. Upon entering the agency, the members would grant.a standing credit. 
The granting of such credit would not constitute a new departure. • Apart 
from existing in bilateral accounts, it also exists to a certain extent 
- with dollar coverage - in inter-Latin American trade, since trade credits 
are often granted for varying terms to facilitate specific exports payable 
in dollars. In addition, the country granting credit within the system 
would receive credit in return. The credit could -be fixed at a suitably 
low level (the amount to be settled by negotiation). Furthermore, 
credit must be granted if the objectives of the free-trade area are to be 
attained. 
In the case of both the a priori and a posteriori systems, each 
country's swing credit with the agency would have to be established 
chiefly on the basis of the size of seasonal disequilibria in traditional 
trade. Some attempt to provide against a possible and perhaps a rapid 
expansion of imports as a result of the establishment of the free-trade 
area would also have to be made. 
To facilitate the formation of some idea of the possible magnitude 
of multilateral credits, it may be worth while to study table 1, which 
presents the values represented by trade among the seven countries 
interested in sc-rcting up the free-trade area. The table draws a distinc-
tion between trade on the basis of bilateral accounts and trade covered 
in dollars. On the basis of these values, some preliminary estimates 
may be hazarded as to the possible amount of each country's swing credits 





TRADE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, 
PARAGUAY, PERU AND URUGUAY, 1958 
(F.o.b. values in millions of dollars) 
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42. One criterion on which to base an estimate of the possible magnitude 
of credits would be the assumption rthat these would have to be sufficient 
to cover in dollars the value of the transactions effected during one 
quarter, or, in other words, equivalent to one-fourth of the value of 
the annual trade of the country concerned with the area. As regards 
the proportions of the bilateral balances to be liquidated through the 
agency,- since the credits established in the bilateral accounts would 
still exist, a smaller proportion could be fixed> such as, for example, 
10 per cent of the value of annual trade through the bilateral accounts 
concerned. 
Accordingly, the estimates given in table 2 were prepared. 
Table 2 
INTER-LATIN AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AREA: ESTIMATE OF POSSIBLE 
MAGNITUDE OF MULTILATERAL CREDIT 
(Millions of dollars) 
Coi.m try-
lr. per cent 
nw.tilateral 
trade 




A a / 
Credit 
B b/ 
Argent ina 5.3 25.0 30.3 15.2 
Bolivia 1.0 0.8 1,8 0-9 
Brazil 0.8 23.1 23.9 II.9 
Chile 8.3 6.1 14.4 7.2 
Paraguay 5.6 0.1 5.7 2.9 
Peru 9.9 1.4 11.3 5.7 
Uruguay 0.7 3.5 4.2 2.1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of the figures in table 1. 
a/ The credits in column A were estimated for each country on 
the basis of 25 per cent of the value of the trade effected 
in 1958 in convertible currency, and 10 per cent of the 
value ®f trade thorough bilateral accounts, 
b/ The credits in column B were calculated on the same bases as 
in the case of column A, but the average value of imports 




43. It is of interest to compare the credits of which the possible 
amount is indicated in table 2 with trade balances in 1958 as between 
the countries that would be organizing the area, in order to form some 
idea of what would have been the size of the surpluses to be multilateral!7 
liquidated through the agency. This is the purpose of table 3« The 
estimates presented in this table must be taken with some degree of caution^ 
since the f.o.b. value of exports on which they had to be based is not 
altogether representative of the balance-of-payments situation, because the 
statistics for services and other invisible items are not available. 
Furthermore, as the bilateral balances would in the first place be absorbed 
outside the agency by the credits provided for in the bilateral accounts 
concerned, table 3 was based on the hypothesis that a proportion equivalent 
to 20 per cent of the value of the balances in question would be incorporated 
in the multilateral liquidation process. Lastly, it should be pointed 
out that the estimates had to be worked out on the basis of annual 
balances, whereas in practice the agency would effect liquidations at 
shorter intervals of 60 or 90 days. Consequently, there might well be 
seasonal disequilibria sharper than those reflected in the annual balance. 
44- Once the magnitude that would be registered by the multilateral 
swing credits as a result of the negotiation conducted on the organization 
of the system he.s been ascertained, it will be possible to m^ke an 
accurate estimate of the maximum amount of the capital or . fund within the 
agency. 
Time-lags would derive, as has already been pointed out, from 
the following circumstance. It may happen that several debtor countries 
have not exceeded the limit of their credits as at a given date, and are 
thus free from any obligation to effect payments to the ¿¿gency. The 
latter, in turn, might find itself compelled to effect payments on the 
same date to a creditor country which had concentrated all the deficits 
of the debtor members in its positive balance. It would thereby have 
exceeded its credit level and would thus be in a position to claim payment 
of the surplus. 
The mode of operation of this capital or fund would resemble, up 





ESTIMATE OF RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS DERIVING FROM TRANSACTIONS IN 1958-









Argentina 30 15 -9 - -
Bolivia 2 1 -6 -4 -5 
Brazil 24 12 14 - 2 
Chile 14 7 -27 -13 -20 
Paraguay- 6 3 4 - 1 
Perni 11 6 28 17 22 
Uruguay 4 2 -4 - -2 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of the figures in table 1. 
a/ Based on example given in table 2 above, 
b/' See note to table 2. Figures are rounded, 
c/ Multilateral plus 20 per cent of bilateral balances. 
\ 
In the case of the agency, the assets in its balance would comprise the 
stock of dollars constituting its capital, plus its credits against 
debtor countries. Its liabilities, on the other hand would include 
credits against the agency in favour of creditor countries and the book 
values of dollar holdings as registered in favour of the countries or 
institutions which supplied them. If trade movements in the area develop 
in conditions of relative equilibrium and member's balances do not exceed 
the credit limits established, the agency1s cash holding will register 
no movement whatsoever. On the other hand, disequilibria in either 
direction in so far as they exceed the gredit level, may reduce or 





In these circumstances, the less favourable hypothesis is that by 
which six of the seven members of the area might reach at one and the 
same time their debtor credit limit, and the seventh country, with the 
lowest credit level, would be the creditor of all of them. In such an 
event, the maximum amount which the agency would be obliged to disburse, 
would be 87 million dpllars in the case of estimate A and 44 million 
in that of estimate B# 
This hypothesis is extremely unlikely to materialize. The figures 
in table 3, prepared in accordance with the assumptions explained above, 
suggest that the agency would not have had to make any payment in case A 
(income and expenditure to the amount of 17 million dollars) and a 
net disbursement of 2 million in case B (income 25 million dollars and 
expenditure 27 million). 
The establishment of certain special interim conditions to facilitate 
accession to the system in the case of countries whose balances in the 
trade that would be covered by the area are persistently favourable, 
would help to prevent the occurrence of a phenomenon such as that 
visualized in the foregoing hypothesis. 
2m, Situation of surviving bilateral accounts 
45. As has already been mentioned, the surviving bilateral accounts would 
be connected with the a priori or a posteriori credit system by the 
surrender of a fixed proportion of the balance (which would be revised 
from time to tiz&o) for purposes of the periodical and automatic 
liquidation effected by the agency. 
It is useful to consider how this provision would affect accounts 
registering high seasonal balances, like the acco\\i:l between Argentina 
and Brazil, the countries which maintain the largest in^x-«Latin 
American trade flow« In this account a great deal ox weight is carried 
by certain goods in respect of which trade values fluctuate appreciably 
form one year to another. Moreover, the operations arising out of trade 
in the goods in question are concentrated in certain periods of each year. 
The sharpest fluctuations are registered in the case of wheat, trade in 




of production, both in Argentina and in Brazil, and the size? of Brazil's 
purchases in other markets. Fluctuations are also bbservabl'e iri trade 
in fresh fruit and timber. 
Table 4 presents the balance of the Argentine-Brazilian payments 
account at the close of each of the last four years. It may be noted 
that in.the period as a whole the balance of payments between the two 
countries showed a net surplus of 6l million dollars, in favour of 
Brazil, with disequilibria reaching 35 million dollars in a single year. 
Table 4 
BALANCES OF THE ACCOUNT HELD BETWEEN- ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
AS ON 31 DECEMBER OF EACH YEAR 
(Millions of dollars) 
v „ _ n a/ Difference m respect Year Balance , ,, r to the preceding year 
1955 -i 10,1 
1956 - 12,.1 22,» 2 
1957 - 15,8 3,7 
1958 t 19.2 35.0 
Source: ECLA-, on the basis of data supplied by-the Banco Central de 
la República Argentina and the Department of Currency and 
Credit (Superintendencia da Moeda e. Crédito) of Brazil 
a/ The signs refer to the position of Brazil. 
These extremely marked fluctuations tend to cancel each other out, 
but over very long terms. Argentina and Brazil have therefore established 
an . unlimited swing credit in their payments account, so that neither 
country rjuns the risk of having to divert dollars to the financing of 
its trade. 
Situations like this account for the caution with which the prospect 
of a change in the existing payments system among some Latin American 
countries is viewed in some circles and for the anxiety that progress 
/toward s mult ilat eral i sm 
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towards multilateralism and convertibility should be gradual enough 
to allow time for the expansion of trade in such items as manufactured 
goods - trade in which might attain a more even and steady flow than 
the commerce in primary commodities at present prevailing - to impart 
some degree of stability tp trade flows between the two countries 
a,nd in the area as a whole» 
3», Credits and internal means of payment 
46» How far would the credits granted under the a priori or a posteriori 
system have inflationary effects in each country? 
It is common knowledge that the inflationary effect of an export 
against credit is exactly the same as that deriving from another whose 
value has been received in dollars which have gone to increase the 
foreign exchange reserve of the exporter country. In other words, 
the expansionist effect depends on the possibility of applying 
the resources obtained from such exports to new imports, which would 
be facilitated within the system by the participation of the largest 
possible number of countries. 
The expansionist monetary repercussions of the credits which 
would be required under the agency system may be regarded as fairly 
limited if their possible magnitude is related to the volume of internal 
meanjs of payment of the countries interested in the formation of the 
area* According to the preliminary calculations in this paper, possible 
credits would represent between 0.9 £nd 1*8 per cent of the means of 




IV. FINAL REMARKS 
47« In this paper, two possible systems for multilateral credits and 
the periodic settlement of transactions among the participating countries 
have been outlined. 
The main differences between the two systems may be summed up as 
follows: 
(a) With respect to transactions effected through bilateral accounts, 
the two systems are identical. In both cases, part of the 
bilateral balances would be liquidated multilaterally and the 
resulting net surplus incorporated into the over-all position 
of each member so that it can be subjected to the settlement 
rules that are agreed upon. 
(b) When transactions are effected in dollars, each system will be 
applied in a different way: (i) under the a priori credit system, 
countries with a surplus would grant internal credits to countries 
with a deficit for the duration of each accounting period, i. e. 
for the 60-day or 90-day interval between the agency's settlements. 
Such credits differ fundamentally from, and are supplementary to, 
the multilateral credits agreed upon with the agency. Their 
amount would, of course, be equal to the amount of the surplus 
recorded for multilateral credits during the whole of the 
accounting period; (ii) under the a posteriori credit system, 
there would be no internal credit. 
48. The operation of the two systems would also differ to some extent: 
(i) Under the a_posteriori system, dollar payments for daily 
transactions would be effected by coiTimercial banks as usual 
through letters of credit, payment orders or drafts, chargeable 
to the accounts held by the partner banks among themselves and 
cleared on New York or any other centre adopted for the same 
purpose. Under the a priori system, on the other hand, opera-
tions among commercial banks would be undertaken as usual, 
except that settlements among partner banks would be cleared on 
the corresponding Central Banks. 
/(ii) Both systems 
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(ii) Both systems would require an accurate computation of transactions 
in order to establish the balance between payments and claims. 
In either case, it should be possible to decentralize the 
computation so that the Central Banks would receive from 
commercial banks only the final balance for the operations of 
each bank with its partner banks in the area. In the one case, 
the Central Banks would naturally take these balances, against 
payment or claim in local currency, whereas, in the other, they 
would have a purely statistical value and would be used to 
ascertain the final position for payments and claims actually 
effected during each accounting period, 
(iii) The accounts maintained under either system by each Central 
Bank with the agency would also be alike inasmuch as they would 
reflect each country1s position vis-à-vis the other participants 
in the area as a whole. Under one system, each country would 
debit or credit its account with the amount accruing from its 
daily transactions, whereas, under the other, the results of 
periodic settlements would not be shown until the close of each 
accounting period. In both cases, howeverf that part of the 
bilateral balances agreed upon for transfer to the agency for 
multilateral settlement would be periodically incorporated. 
49. Either of the two formulas outlined, or any other of a similar 
nature, would provide the credit facilities required to forge ahead 
boldly with the programme of trade liberalization and, at the same time, 
gradually to impart the necessary uniformity and convertibility to 
intra-area payments. The countries themselves would have to study the 
positive and- negative features of each system in the light of their own 
interests and possibilities as well as of the common desire to attain 
the aims pursued by the free-trade area. 
B 
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYSTEM OF SWING CREDITS 
IN THE FREE-TRADE AREA 




During talks which representatives of the secretariat of the Economic 
. Coimdssion for Latin America (EGLfl) held in Washington last November with 
officials of the International Monetary Fund, as well as with representatives 
•f the United States Government connected.with the Fund, an explanation was 
given of the meaning and scope of the two alternative proposals for a system 
of swing credits submitted by the secretariat to the Governments participating 
in the forth coming central banks meeting at Montevideo.^ The most important 
points alucidated in the Washington taJJks are briefly reviewed below, together * 
with certain relevant comments. 
I 
1« The establishment ©f a system of swing credits for the projected free-
trade area is not dictated by balance-of-parents ccnsi-jr̂ atioiicb 
Indisputably, payments equilibrium must be sought in the aggregate, not 
bilaterally or with respect to a group of. countries. The aim pursued is not to 
balance payments*, but to stimulate an energetic liberalisation policy in respect 
of trade among the countries of the area. Most of those that have already 
attained convertibility have done so through the application of heavy surcharges 
or prior deposits to restrict imports. The imposition o:' those restrictions 
has been decisively influenced by general motives connected with the balance 
of payments« 
In practice, apart from what might be achieved through negotiations 
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a liberalization 
pact designed to abolish such restrictions vis~a^vis the rest of the world 
in general, in exchange for equivalent concessions, would be*r inconceivable« 
But such an agreement might well be feasible among the Latin American countries, 
since in each of them the increase in each one's imports brought about by the 
liberalization policy would be concomitant with the effect on its own exports 
1/ Working paper No. 1, dated 30 October 1959. 
/of the 
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©t the liberalization measures applied by the *ther countries» This-̂ is a. 
promising field for the expansion *f trade» 
Presumably, no country would adopt such a liberalization policy unless 
reciprocity existed. Moreover, the reciprocity principle was clearly defined 
fey the Governments in the draft treaty on a free-trade area adopted at 
Montevideo. 
It would not be justifiable to import against dollars, from countries 
members of the area, goods which on account of the dollar shortage are not 
now imported from the rest of the world. As regards imports at present 
effected from the rest of the world, what would be the point of ceasing to 
purchase them in other regions and bringing them in from within the area if 
-they still had to be bought with" the dollars that are so hard to come by?" ** 
If such imports were not paid for on the basis of additional exports, no 
advantage would attach to the deflection of trade towards the area, as, 
commercially speaking, imports from the rest of the world are usually nwre 
attractive» 
It may be useful to recall the essence of the principle of reciprocity» 
The countries of the area are proposing to expand their trade in order to 
expedite economic development. If a country increases its imparts from the 
rest, it stimulates their development, and consequently may expect that its 
partner countries will encourage its own development by purchasing more of 
its exports. There is nothing in this which differs essentially from the 
principle of reciprocity as it is traditionally observed in any negotiation 
of commercial treatiesc 
2» In the course of the Washington talks twa criticism*'* of the reciprocity 
principle as formulated in the draft treaty were put forwardc The more 
importan was to the effect that mere correlation between the expansion of 
imports and that of exports did not necessarily imply equivalent" beftefitfc. 
country might in fact incrsase its exports cf gc*ds whose sale within the 
area depended only slightly or not at p.11 upon preferences, and receive in 





The reply to this criticism is that such situations must be subject 
of negotiation. If a country has no difficulty in exporting certain 
goods to the world market, it may not have to depend ©n preferences in 
order to find a sale for them within the area. There would consequently 
be no reason to apply the reciprocity principle in the case of exports 
effected in this way, without need of preferential treatment« As 
stipulated in the draft treaty, this principle would be applicable only to 
goods enjoying such preferences. 
Furthermore, each country will be free to choose the goods in respect 
of which it wishes to grant preferences, and will do so in the degree and 
measure in which it can obtain similar treatment from the other countries 
of the area» Thus, the application of the reciprocity principle, far from 
being automatic, would be dependent on negotiation among the contracting 
parties. 
The second criticism was that the reciprocity principle might give rise 
to arbitrarily-created;situations. A persistent excess wf exports over 
imports might perhaps be the result of natural factors which would have to 
be respected. But what is meant by "natural factors", and which of them are 
involved here? Would the term be used in its proper sense, when the tariff 
system - the outcome of a specific policy « restricted imports? Of course 
not. If, by virtue of the concessions granted by its partner countries, a 
country develops a certain persistent excess of exports to the area, the 
logical inference seems to be that it should speed up its liberalization 
policy in order to increase its imports from the area. It is precisely 
thus that the application of the reciprocity principle was visualized in the 
draft treaty» 
I 1 
3tm In connexion with the system of swing credits, attention was drawn to 
the following two essential aspects: 
(a) Firstly, countries which, as a result of liberalization policy, 
develop an excess of imports from the area should have at theAr disposal 
credits up to a pre-determined limit to enable them to absorb the possible 
adverse effects of the policy in question, time being thus allowed for their 
exports to feel the benefit of the liberalization measures applied by the 
other countries. In default of such credits, prudence would dictate the 
greatest caution in putting liberalization policy into effect, lest new 
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(b) Secondly* countries developing an excess of exports would have to 
grant credits to the importer countries again up to pre-determined 
limits® 
Unquestionably, if these latter creditor countries, without granting 
any credit at all, were immediately to receive payment for their excess 
exports, they would have little interest in taking prompt measures to 
expedite their liberalization policy» But if they were under the. 
obligation to grant a credit, and this could be mobilized within the 
area for the purpose of effecting more imports, a strong incentive to 
liberalization would be generated« 
4. There would seem to be no fundamental objection to these two principles 
which are grounded on considerations of trade policy not of payments policy 
The objections raised related rather to the method of application. A 
great deal of stress was laid on the undesirability of granting credits 
. to,., .debtor countries automatically. Such credits, it was affirmed, should 
be made the subject of negotiation. They sould preferably be granted 
only when a deterioration in the aggregate balance-^of-payments rendered 
such a step essential, and always providing that it did not jeopardize the 
policy of monetary control which a country had to pursue in order to 
achieve balance~of-payments equilibrium. 
However, : c is clear that the certainty of having credit available 
would help to induce countries to carry their liberalization policy as far 
as they considered feasible and that the lack of automatic!ty, at any 
rats to begin with, might seriously affect the scops and efficacy of the 
measures adoptedo 
Undoubtedly, Governments will have to weigh the pros and cons of 
these arguments with great care, before finally deciding on the solution 
they will select for so important an aspect of the problem. 
% The desirability of a lesser degree of automaticity was also 
discussed in connection with the credits to be granted by countries with 
a favourable balance. In this context, it was suggested that the 
credit, might be liquidated when the creditor country demonstrated that 




but to that of the debtor countries. How far the exercise of such a faculty 
could be carried would of course depend upon the degree of automacity of the 
credits granted to debtor countries, since these are two closely interrelated 
aspects of one and the same problem, 
III 
6, It was emphasized in the discussion that what was essential was the 
availability of a credit system which would facilitate liberalization within 
the area, always through the expansion, not the contraction, of trade* 
If this criterion is adopted, the selection of the credit system will 
depend mainly upon practical considerations. In the report submitted by the 
ECLA secretariat to the Governments concerned, two alternative formulae are put 
forward: one of these was prompted by certain aspects of the European Payments 
Union machinery, while the other takes into* account certain features of the 
subseauent European Monetary Agreement. 
Strcng objections were raised to the first formula. Its adoption would 
mean that accounts had to be kept of all the trade operations of each country 
with the other members of the area. It was feared that such a system might help 
to perpetuate bilateralism in those countries which had not yet succeeded in 
eliminating it, or to re-establish it in those where it had already been discarded. 
To avert this risk, the avoidance of any kind of accounting system was felt to 
be desirable. 
The existence of the risk is undeniable, although it ,uay be recalled that 
in Europers experience the Payments Union, rather than perpetuating bilateralism, 
helped to get rid of it. The determinants of bilateralism are not accounting 
systems, since these did not previously exist, but phenomena of another sort, 
which are just what the policy of liberalization and reciprocity in the free— 
trade area would seek to remedy. 
There is yet another motive of concern. The fluctuations of the exchange 
rate, in the course of daily operations, might give rise to speculative 




operations in the. central bank of the country concerned, a procedure 
which would detract from the desired speed and simplicity as regards 
the formalities involved. 
7. To forestall such misgivings, the secretariat report also presents 
an alternative formula whereby operations in the area would be liquidated 
daily in dollars. Periodically, countries which, according to a 
statistical reckoning, had shown a surplus attributable to liberalization 
would-have to deposit the dollars they had received, up to a certain pre-
determined sum. These resources would be placed at the disposal of 
countries with a déficit, in the form of loans. Thus the ik&k of account, 
implicit in the preceding formula, would be completely eliminated. 
Alongside this advantage) the formula under discussion has the 
drax\back - as was pointed out - that a central bank might find itself 
compelled to purchase dollars on the market in order to make the deposit 
referred to at a time the surplus in its favour had not yet brought an 
inflow of dollars to strengthen its foreign exchange position. However, 
in so far as the countries of the area decided against making these 
reimbursements and deposits automatic, 1-he disadvantage indicated, if 
indeed it is one, could be modified eliminated. 
The trend towards the re-establishment of convertibility is 
unquestionably of great importance0 But it must be accompanied by 
sweeping measures to liberalise trade among the countries meaabers of the 
area. The mere numerous these members become, the more effectively 
can the liberalization policy be implemented and the more faithfully 
,the reciprocity principle be observed. 
Liberalization policy and the restoration of convertibility are 
perforce complementary to the introduction of the latter arid a system 
of swing qredits creates no obstacle. On the contrary, the success of 
a liberalization policy stimulated by the swing credit system would help 
to make convertibility an established and lasting reality. 
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1« This report summarizes the conclusions reached at the Meeting of 
Governmental Representatives of Central Banks held at Montevideo, 
Uruguay, in January I960, in compliance with resolution 3 adopted 
at the first session of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the 
Establishment of a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries 
(Montevideo, 16-30 September 1959). 
2. In this resolution, the Conference, after taking note that the • 
delegations present had reported on the payments systems in force in 
their respective countries and had voiced their opinions as to the best 
way of effecting payments in the Area, expressed the view that their 
statements had raised special questions which should be examined at 
length. It therefore recommended that a meeting should be convened 
at which top-ranking experts would represent the Central Banks of the 
countries that were negotiating the establishment of the free-trade area. 
It also requested the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to undertake 
special studies on internal payments problems in the projected free-trade 
area on ways and means of salving them. The resolution further invited 
the Central Banks of the other Latin American countries to send observers 
to the meeting, and, lastly, requested ECLA to organize the meeting and, 





I. MEETING OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES OF CENTRAL BANKS 
A. Attendance and organization of work 
Opening meeting 
3. The session was inaugurated on 12 January I960 in the Board Room 
of the Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay» which generously 
provided all the facilities needed for the success of the proceedings. 
At the opening meeting an address was delivered by Mr» Mateo Magarifioe de 
Melo, Chairman óf the Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establishment of 
a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries. Speeches were also 
made by Mr. Homero Martínez Montero, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Uruguay, and Mr. Felipe Gil, head of the Uruguayan delegation. Mr. Luis 
Mackenna, head of the Chilean delegation, spoke on behalf of the 
delegations present. After the officers had been elected, a statement 
on technical aspects was made by Mr. Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary 
of ECLA, He was followed by Mr. Herbert K. Zassenhaus, representing 
the International Monetary Fund. 
Membership and attendance 
4« The meeting was attended by representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and observers from the Central 
Banks of Colombia. Ecuador and Mexico, as well as from the Board of 
Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Council of 
Commerce and Production. The list of participants is as follows: 
Governmental representatives 
Argentina: Alberto H. Mage, Exchange Mänager, Central Bank 
Rodolfo Korenjak 
Teodoro A. Fernández 










Maíio Qjara Agreda, General Adviser to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 
Hugo Ortiz Justiniano 
Claudio Calderón 
Luis Viscarra 
Herculano Borges da Fonseca, Chief of the Division of 
Economics, Department of Currency and Credit 
Paulo Cabral de Mello 
Ernane Galveas 
Alcides P. Costa -
Lázaro Bauman das Neves 
Irlio Octavio de Figueiredo Pessoa 
J»0# Knaack de Souza, (Observer) 
Luis Mackenna, General Manager of the Central Bank 
Eduardo Morgan 
Juan Félix Morales, Director of the Central Bank 
Julio Sanabria 
Emilio Foley, General Manager, Banco Agropecuario 
José Morales Urresti 
Rodolfo León Carrera 
Felipe Gil, Director, Banco de la República 
Antonio Odicini Lezama 
Crisólogo Brotos 
Mario H. Maldini 
Romeo Maeso Sueiro 
Luis I. Carlevaro 
Julio C# Solsona Flores 
Washington E. Demaría 
Alberto Casal 
Alberto Morillo Otero 
Juan Ct Arrosa 
Juan A.* Eguiluz 
Juan C# Mussio 
Advisers: D. Flaubiano Simoens Arce 
Luis C. Panizea 
Gilberto Boasso 
Raúl H„ Torre 
Fernando Oliu 
Washington E, Souto 
Mario Buchelli 





Colombia: Rodrigo Botero, Economic Adviser, Banco de la República 
Ecuador: José María Aviles Mosquera, Director, Exchange Department, 
Central Bank 
Mexico: Octaviano Campos Salas, Manager, Banco de México 
Panama: Fernando Diaz, Deputy Manager, Banco Nacional 
Representatives of various national and international organizations 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary 
Esteban Ivovich, Director, Trade Policy Division 
Alberto Solá, Economist, Trade Policy Division 
Julio Valdés, Deputy Secretary of the Commission 
Organization of American States 
Phillip Glaessner, Deputy Director, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 
Advisers: Michael Zuntz 
Fernando Fugazot 
International Monetary Fund 
Herbert K# Zassenhaus 
Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production 
Carlos Sanguinetti, Vice-President for the American continent 
José Ma, Roca Sienra, Adviser, Uruguayan Section 
Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System 
Ives Maroni, Economist, Division of International Finance 
Officers 
5» The meeting elected the following officers: 
Chairman: Felipe Gil (Uruguay) 
V.ice-Chairman: Alberto H# Mage (Argentina) 
Herculano Borges da Fonseca (Brazil) 
Secretariat 
6, The duties of secretariat of the meeting were discharged by the ECLA 





7« The following agenda was adopted: 
1. Opening speeches 
2. Election of officers 
3m Adoption of the agenda 
4. Possible credit and payments systems 
5# General discussion 
6. Adoption of the report and.conclusions to be 
submitted to the second session of the.Inter-
Governmental Conference for the Establishment of 
a Free-Trade Area among Latin American Countries 
Documents 
Payments and credits in the free-trade area projected 
by L&tin American countries: possible systems 
Memorandum on a system of swing credits in the free-
trade area projected by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay 
Further considerations on the system of swing credits 
in the free-trade area 
Payments problems among the countries proposing to 
form a Latin American Free-Trade Area and possible 
solutions • (International Monetary Fund report) 
II. CONCLUSIONS 
9# As a result of the discussions, the representatives of the Central 
Banks of the participating countries established the following conclusions 
Conclusions of the Meeting of Governmental Representatives of 
Central Banks, to be brought to the attention of the Inter-
Governmental Conference for the Establishment of a Free-Trade 
Area among Latin American Countries 
Governmental representatives of the Central Banks of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay met at Montevideo 
on 12-19 January I960, in conformity with resolution 3, adopted at the 
first session of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the Establishment 




The meeting examined the information relating to the different 
payments systems - through bilateral accounts and in convertible 
currencies - in use in the region and discussed the way in which 
credits might be used to facilitate the achievement of the ecohomic 
ends pursued by the establishment of a free-trade area.' 
During the discussions important elucidatory statements were 
made on fundamental aspects of the questions under consideration and 
useful guide-lines were laid down, thanks to which it will be possible 
to press on gradually with the endeavour to find solutions that will 
meet the dynamic requirements of the free-trade area» The conclusions 
reached by the meeting in that respect were as follows: 
(a) In the field of payments the target to be aimed at 
is free currency convertibility; 
(b) The fact that differing systems of payments and 
credits are in force in the region is no obstacle 
to the entry into operation of the free-trade area, 
in accordance with the firm intention of the countries 
represented at the meeting; 
(c) In the free-trade area, every endeavour must be made 
to obviate the discriminatory treatment to which 
the existence of differing payments and credit systems 
might otherwise give rise; 
(d) In order that the free-trade area may fully attain 
its objectives, access to appropriate credits for 
the financing of intra-area transactions should be 
facilitated. To this end,-/the study of possible 
systems of payments and credits should be continued, 
due regard being paid to the observations and views 
expressed in the course of the meeting. 
D 
THE RECIPROCAL CREDITS SYSTEM FOR THE FREE-TRADE AREA 
Observations by the ECLA secretariat arising out of the 
Meeting of Governmental Representatives of Central Banks 
(Montevideo, January I960) 




The Montevideo discussions cleared the way for the establishment 
of a credit system, which would meet the requirements of the free—trade 
area. They showed that in such a system there was nothing which 
conflicted with the principle of convertibility or with any other sound 
monetary principle. Yet certain misgivings were expressed in connexion 
with the institution of an agency to handle credit operations among the 
countries of the area# These apprehensions were no longer grurided on 
reasons of principle, but on considerations relating to the ill-effects 
that might result from possible mismanagement. In this context, too, 
the Montevideo talks were very enlightening. 
I. THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY . 
Equivalence of trade benefits 
The Governments interested in the establishment of the free-trade 
area requested the secretariat to study a credit system suited to its 
purposes. Such a system could not be projected in the abstract, but 
. ? 1 
only in close relation to the objectives of the area in question. The 
basic end pursued is the creation of additional inter-Latin American 
trade flows, which, by promoting industrial specialization, and brisker 
competition within the area, as well as more efficient productive 
utilization of the land, may help to speed up the rate of economic 
development. 
There is no reason why the creation of thsr,e additional trade flows 
should affect trade with the rest of the worlds The volume of this 
latter is dependent upon external demand, especially from the great 
industrial centres, and on the capacity of the Latin American countries 
to satisfy such demand and to avoid certain errors of economic policy 




With a view to attaining the objective referred to, the proposed 
draft treaty sets up a preferential system under which negotiations 
will have to be conducted for the reduction and abolition of duties and 
restrictions among the contracting parties» Obviously, in the course 
of such negotiations each country will endeavour to ensure that the 
benefits it receives from the other members are equivalent to those it 
grants them. But, however great the care and wisdom displayed, there 
will be no possible way of assessing the results of these reciprocal 
benefits in advance. It was therefore deemed expedient to include in 
the draft provision for a corrective procedure, consisting in successive 
adjustments, whereby effective reciprocity could be achieved. 
Before this procedure is explained, a point should be cleared up 
in connexion with the kinds of goods traded. On the one hand, a first 
category includes those export commodities which find a relatively easy 
sale on the world market, and which the contracting parties will have no 
particular interest in diverting towards the free-trade area through the 
system of preferences. And on the other hand, there are most of the 
goods in which inter-Latin American trade is at present conducted, together 
with those industrial products which might give rise to steadily expanding 
reciprocal trade flows. It is this second category of goods that will be 
the subject of negotiations under the preferential system. 
The first category comprises a few traditional export commodities. 
The rate of growth of world demand for these is, of course, relatively 
weak, and the development of Latin American demand will open up new 
prospects for the expansion of production. Only a preferential system 




Method of achieving equivalence in practice 
The only yardstick whereby the effects of the reciprocal benefits 
granted can be measured in practice is the increase in each member 
country!s exports and imports of all the goods covered by the preferential 
system. The aim of the procedure established in the draft treaty is to 
ensure that countries with a persistent export surplus of the conmodities 
in question vis-a-vis the other members of the area expedite the reduction 
or abolition of duties and restrictions in order to facilitate the develop-
ment of countries in the opposite situation, i.e., having a persistent 
import surplus. Naturally, if the objectives of the treaty are to be 
fulfilled, each country will have to map out its programme for the reduction 
or elimination of duties and restrictions so that it will be able to 
negotiate for reciprocal benefits in the governmental conmittee to be set 
up under the terms of the draft agreement. In cases where a persistent 
export surplus occurs, the implementation of this programme will have to 
be speeded up. It might be advisable for the following supplementary 
provision to be included in the treaty: if the foregoing measure proved 
inadequate, the country with a persistent import surplus would be entitled 
to reduce and abolish duties and restrictions at a slower rate» 
Reciprocal encouragement of economic development 
The fact that reciprocity is established in relation to commodities 
in rospect of which benefits would be accorded, other commodities being 
excluded, is clear proof that the principle in question is dictated not by 
balance-of-payments considerations but by motives of trade policy. 
What are these motives? It has already been pointed out that the 
underlying purpose of the free-trade area is to contribute to the accelera-
tion of economic development. The expansion of exports achieved by any 
given country with the help of the concessions it has been granted encourages 
its economic development, and in return it must afford the other members a 
corresponding stimulus through the increase of their own exports. Otherwise, 
that would be the advantage of the free-trade area for a country that 




without securing a corresponding expansion of its exports? What is 
more, not only would it obtain no benefits, but the consequences of 
this lack of equivalence might actually be prejudicial to it, since it 
would have to pay for the difference between exports and imports in 
dollars that it could have used more advantageously for imports from 
the rest of the world. 
Reciprocity with the rest of the world 
Following this explanation of the raison d*etre of the reciprocity 
principle, the question may arise why it should be extended only to the 
free-trade area countries, and not to the rest of the worlds There is 
an essential difference with respect to export possibilities. In inter-
Latin American trade such possibilities are vast, both for traditional 
export commodities and, more particularly, for those industrial goods in 
which veiy little trade has hitherto been conducted. The same is not 
usually true of the Latin American countries1 trade with the great 
industrial centres. Here the prospects are, for the time being, limited, 
and an intensive expansion of exports of traditional commodities can hardly 
be expected, since it is common knowledge that, in their case, the income-
elasticity of demand is relatively slight. Undeniably, the feebleness of 
world demand for such goods is also partly attributable to the protectionist 
policy pursued by the importer countries; were this relaxed, considerable 
impetus might well be given, to Latin America's exports. From another point 
of view, no intensive development of- the region*s capacity to export 
manufactured, goods to the great industrial centres could reasonably be 
expected. Yet such a possibility does indeed exist, and in a high degree, 
within the sphere of inter-Latin American trade, and as it i's exploited in 
practice and the volume of industrial output increases, alongside increased 
specialization in manufacturing activities, costs will gradually fall also, 
and the region will find it feasible to begin exporting industrial products 
to the great centres on a relatively large scale. There will then be an 
opportunity at present precariously limited to traditional commodities -
of negotiating-with these centres on bases of reciprocity, although not 
necessarily on. the lines laid down in the treaty. 
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II. THE RECIPROCAL CREDITS SYSTEM 
Function of credits 
It was stated above that, if reciprocity is to be achieved in 
practice, individual countries will have to expedite or retard the 
implementation of their programmes for the reduction or elimination of 
duties and restrictions. However, it will take some time for these 
readjustments to yield results, and, in the meanwhile, there will still 
be instances in which the increases in exports and imports generated by 
the treaty fail to keep abreast of each other. This constitutes a strong 
argument in favour of the establishment of a reciprocal credits system. 
The monetary reserves of the Latin American countries are generally 
far from sufficient, and the trend of their import requirements from the 
rest of the world is apt to climb more rapidly than that of their export 
possibilities. In these circumstances, prudence would seem to counsel 
great caution as regards liberalization commitments (in the broadest sense 
of the term, i,e0, reducti^p and abolition of duties and restrictions), 
unless additional credits are available to cover any balance-of-psyments 
deterioration to which this liberalization policy may give rise. In other 
words, the function of credit will be to allow time for the possible adverse 
effects of liberalization measures on a countryTs balance of payments to be 
succeeded by the favourable consequences of those liberalization measures 
which countries with a persistent export surplus will have to adopt. 
Thus, the secretariat, in compliance with the request submitted to 
it, has studied a credit system calculated to help in ensuring that the 
principle of reciprocity, vhich is the cornerstone of the whole agreement, 
is respected. The Montevideo discussions, it must be repeated, 
strengthened the conviction that a system of this kind can be established 




Credits and convertibility 
In this connexion, concern was expressed as to whether a reciprocal 
credits system might not present an obstacle on the road to convertibility 
on which some of the Latin American countries have successfully started 
out, or, what would be even worse, actually compel them to retrace their 
steps» , The discussion showed that there would be no objection whatever 
to the establishment of a reciprocal credits system entirely in dollars, 
not in units of account, which would in no way jeopardize convertibility. 
For the sake of elucidating so important a point, a reminder must first be 
given of how such a system might operate, 
A reciprocal credits agency vrould be set up for the countries of the 
area, through which the reciprocal credits that each countiy was prepared 
to grant to the others as a whole, and vice versa, would be negotiated 
periodically and in advance. 
An agency contrived on these lines would have no reason to intervene 
in international payments. These would be effected in dollars, as in the 
case of ordinaiy operations under a convertibility system; but periods 
(possibly quarterly) for computing the results of such payments would be 
set. If, at the end of any given quarter, the reckoning were to show that 
a countiy had paid out more dollars than it had received by virtue of area 
preferences, and that the outcome had been a deterioration in its balance-
of-payments position, the country concerned would be empowered to make use 
of the credit previously assigned to it.' In other words, the countiy would 
recover its excess dollar disbursement, wholly or in part, according to the 




The dollars thus recovered by countries with an import surplus 
could be used unrestrictedly both within the free-trade area and in 
the rest of the world, without any effect on convertibility. On this 
point it would seem that the doubts existing prior to the Montevideo 
talks were completely dispelled. 
Source of funds for the system 
This was not equally true, however, of certain misgivings relating 
to the resources that would be contributed under the system to enable it 
to grant the credits just referred to. In this context, an important 
distinction was drawn during the discussions with respect to the sourse 
of such funds. Dollar contributions might be determined in advance, 
in the shape of quotas to be subscribed by each country in accordance 
with certain indices of financial capacity; or they might be based in 
each instance on the surplus dollar payments received by any country (as 
previously described) in consequence of the preferential concessions. 
This distinction does not mean that the two sources are mutually 
incompatible, for even if the second were1drawn upon for contributions, 
it would be necessary, as shown in the ECLA reports, for the system to 
have a capital fund at its disposal, which might be set up with 
contributions from the first of the sources indicated«^ 
Operation of the agency 
Before passing to the objections raised to the second source of funds, 
it may be useful to give a brief explanation of how the system would operate 
on the basis of contributions of this type. 
1/ Yet another combination of funds from the two sources is conceivable. 
For example, contributions might be established in advance and a quota 
fixed for each country, but instead of their being payable immediately, 
these contributions would be claimed only when it became necessary to 
grant credits to countries with an import surplus. In such an event, 
countries with a correlative excess of exports would be called upon to 




. Countries which had received surplus dollar payments would be under 
the obligation to deposit them with the agency at the end of the period of 
reckoning, up to the amount of the credit they had pledged, themselves to 
grant. The credit thus extended by any one country to the agency would 
not be frozen; on the contrary, it would be available to cover an import 
surplus should the said country Ts position be reversed as a result of the 
acceleration of its progranme for the reduction of duties and restrictions, 
to which reference was made earlier. Thus, if a country which had 
previously shown an export surplus came to have an import surplus, and had 
consequently, effected excess payments, it could recover the dollars concerned, 
as in the preceding case, by means of a credit granted by the agency, and 
this credit would be compensated at once, with as much as was necessary of 
the credit extended by the country to the agency. 
The root of the arguments against contributions of this order lies 
in the incentive that-would thus be provided for an expansion of imports 
from the area; for it would obviously be to the interest of a country 
which had granted credit to the agency to mobilize it as quickly as possible, 
by making more purchases ftom other member countries. This is exactly what 
is aimed at in the treaty, and the criticisms levelled at this objective 
will be discussed below. 
III. OBJECTIONS TO A CREDIT SYSTEM BASED ON RESOISCES 
DERIVING FROM EXPORT SURPLUSES 
Limited application of creditors* resources 
The irjst important objection related to the.-'mobilisation of credit 
resources granted to the agency by countries with export surpluses. Such 
resources, it was asserted, should be available to cover imports not only 
from within the area, but also from the rest of the world. Were this 
the case, implementation of the principle of reciprocity, far from being 
promoted, would be impeded; in order to retain at its disposal for the 
longest possible time resources which it could use to effect purchases 
anywhere else in the world, on better terms, generally speaking, than within 
the area, a country with an export surplus resulting from benefits obtained 
under the treaty would be inclined to wait until the last moment before 
honouring the liberalization commitments imposed by the principle of 
reciprocity. /Another view 
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Another view expressed was that restricting to the free-trade area 
the use of the resources deposited with the agency would imply non-
convertibility, This would mean that any credit which could not be used 
in all parts of the world would run counter to the principle of convertibility. 
This point too was discussed at length. The loans issued by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are by their very 
nature unrestrictedly available for use anywhere in the.world. The credits 
granted by the United States Export-Import Bank, on the contrary, like those 
of the Development Fund and some of those extended by European countries, can 
be applied only in ways that will promote the export trade of the countries 
according them, and not to finance exports from other parts of the world. 
If these limitations were not considered incompatible with the principle of 
convertibility, there is no reason why such a drawback should be imputed to 
credits granted with a view to furthering reciprocal export trade within 
the area, that is, to attaining the primary objective of the treaty. 
Diversion of exports from the world market 
A further argument adduced was that, in order to liquidate such credits 
against the agency, the creditor country would find itself compelled to 
divert normal trade flows, to the detriment of exports that could easily be 
sold to the rest ox the world by other countries, which would thus be 
induced to import from the area goods that they had formerly purchased 
freely in any part of the world. 
The reply to this contention was that reciprocity and the credits 
system related to the goods classified in the second of the categories 
mentioned above, in respect of which the expansion of exports was desirable. 
There is no reason why a country that finds it easy to sell certain 
commodities on the world market should accept or negotiate preferences and 
reciprocity in respect of these trade items unless it is attracted by the 
prospect of opening up a new market within the Latin American region. But 
such a situation is obviously not typical, since most countries will plainly 
be interested in availing themselves of the advantages offered by the Latin 





; It was also contended that the available resources held by a 
countiy in the agency (or the credit it could obtain therefrom) might 
encourage non-essential or luxury imports» This is, of course, an 
argument which bears on the use of a countiy rs monetary reserves in 
general, not only the agency funds, and raises a problem of a different 
nature, which must not be confused with the question under consideration. 
If -it is felt to be desirable on economic grounds to curtail consumption 
of luxury items, the mere levying of import duties does not solve the 
problem, since it may prove an incentive to capital investment in the 
production of such goods and this has actually happened in some cases; 
the taxation concerned would then have to be extended to these lines of 
production too, if the aim was to restrict consumption* But were this 
not so, there would be no reason why liberalization measures should not 
' be applied to imports of such goods whenever the time seemed ripe for 
such a step, as here too the advantages of specialisation and division of 
labour within the, free-trade area still hold good0 
Discrj-mination gainst debtors 
It was ti.oo affirmed that the accumulation of credits would lead to 
trade discrimluaticn; the creditor country might find itself obliged, at 
a given moment, to rechannel the exports it had been shipping to debtor 
countries in order not to increase the amount of credits deposited. To 
this objection two definite replies were vouchsafed. In the first place, 
there would be no room for ct:L,?<?rimination under the agreement. Secondly, 
there woul?. be no question r vlablishing .unlimited espies; their 
amount >joi;li be determined by risgotiation among tha parties and in relation 
to the volume of trade. Wadu is more, such crocL"c would be negotiable 
at regular intervals, and if they proved disproportionate to the end 
pursued, there would be nothing to prevent reduction of the amount involved 





Credits granted by countries with an aggregate payments deficit 
It was likewise pointed out that the system under discussion would 
mean that a country to which a dollar surplus had accrued from its intra-
area operations would have to grant credit to the agency and return all 
or some of the dollars in question, even if it registered a payments 
deficit on the rest of its transactions, both within the area (in goods 
belonging to the first category and not.covered by the treaty) and with 
the rest of the world. If such a situation should arise, it would not 
be through trade with the area that the deficit would have to be remedied, 
but by the application of appropriate balance-of-payments measures, 
whether these were of a monetary nature or of a more far-reaching kind 
designed to bring about structural changed and restore equilibrium. 
Moreover, a country in such a situation could not expect to right itself 
at the expense of the monetary reserves of another country whose balance-
of-payments position had deteriorated as a result of liberalization policy. 
Automaticity of credits 
The automaticity of credits also gave rise tc certain objections. 
Nevertheless, there was a consensus of opinion to the effect thqt credits 
should not be negotiated in every individual case, but that a credit line 
should be established for a given period, after which recourse should be 
had to renegotiation for the introduction of such adjustments as were seen 
to be advisable in the light of experience, A credit line thus operated 
would have frj advantages of automaticity inasmuch as it x̂ ould give debtor 
countries th-3 assurance that in specific circumstances, previously agreed 
upon, they have free acw^s to credit; and at the same time it would 
be flexible enough for any undesirable situation that might arise to be 




Consolidation of convertibility 
If the whole problem is viewed in^broader perspective, it is 
clear that a reciprocal credits system ihich encouraged the development 
of trade among the countries of the area, far from impeding convertibility, 
would help to establish it on soxinder bases than the very shaky foundations 
existing in several of the South American countries to-day. 
To make some currencies convertible, exchange control measures have 
had to be replaced by exchange restrictions in the shape of surcharges 
and prior deposits. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction; 
but, on the other hand, the fact that the movement towards convertibility 
has had to be accompanied by these restrictions can hardly afford much 
cause for satisfaction. • The balance-of-payments situation must therefore 
be improved by degress, so that the exchange restrictions in question can 
be abolished (not only among the Latin American countries, as has already 
been done in some cases, but vis-a-vis the rest of the world), and the 
only customs duties applied to imports are those necessitated by 
protectionist or fiscal considerations. The sole -way of achieving such 
an improvement in the balance of payments will be through the expansion of 
exports and Jr.port substitution; and in the whole of this field, the 
institution < * fc.v? free-trace area and the establishment of a reciprocal 
crouit? syjivi* liou'id be of vital importance. Thus, far from making 
ccv;.v?rti\\i3j.';.y harder to achieve, these measures would contribute to its 
consolida li otu 
Ob;' g^tionff _ v.j jton. on ̂ n.^eocjr 
io lo.'-a m r reraV; the Montevideo talks, vi.Tch constituted 
th3 y^-y^vatoz/ v;crk, it rLoiud be possible, in i,/.--: o^i^lon of the ECIA 
seer oUrlat,' to consider specific ways and means of ¿\sUlil.ishing a 
reciprocal credits system, which, without affecting the essential 
principle of convertibility, will contribute to the attainment of the 




Undoubtedly, an indispensable prerequisite for a credits system 
would be the establishment of an agency with juridical powers. This 
idea too was in itself a target for criticism. Doubts were expressed 
regarding how such an agency could be run by the countries concerned. 
Attention has just been drawn to the apprehension felt with regard to 
escessive accumulations of credit and the dis criminations to which they 
might lead, and, in addition, to the non-essential imports which a country 
might use such credits to effect. 
All these motives of concern form part of a much broader problem. 
The policy of the free-trade area vail not be easy to carry out. Never 
before have the Latin American Governments embarked upon joint action of 
such far-reachimg scope, and to put this idea into practice they will have 
to initiate an experiment which, particularly in the early days vail 
present great difficultiesc It will depend upon how these problems are 
solved whether the fi*ee~trade area is to be really effective in promoting 
trade and ecoeAStle development, or is to become a static mechanism, and 
even one whiefe unless handled with a high sen®« of responsibility 
produce di&itti^ng ts. 
The suggestion that the Governments will be unable to shoulder this 
responsibility with sucoess cannot be considered an adequate motive for 
not cresting tto area or for depriving it of a proper credit 
mechanl&a» ifei» f^vwia&ents will of necessity have to try the experiment 
and learn by ifc-oir ssis takes, and this effort must at all costs be made 
if they 4)re lo fĉ assiental growth problem 0 To suppose that 
the basic pri fe"1 satisfsc'oory operation of the area and 
super-vlĉ or.'. uf th©;-;? ix^ia'^^tation must be provided from outside, instead 
of eimrpsxt: a® a gtett&a© of the experiment, itself, would be to 
shirk obseFvanos of V m principle of international co-operation. 

